1) West Papuan self-determination must
involve Jakarta, says Lilo
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http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/239500/west-papuan-self-determination-must-involve-jakarta,-says-lilo
1) West Papuan self-determination must involve Jakarta, says Lilo
Updated at 4:17 pm today
The Solomon Islands Prime Minister says any self-determination efforts in Indonesia's Papua region must be made in conjunction with Jakarta.
Gordon Darcy Lilo and other leaders in the Melanesian Spearhead Group are considering a bid for membership by the indigenous Melanesians of Papua region.
Mr Lilo, who says Jakarta has taken heed of his call for an end to abuses by security forces in Papua, describes Indonesia's legitimacy over the region as unquestionable.
He says the choice by West Papuans to join Indonesia was made with the 1969 Act of Free Choice, although the referendum is widely regarded as having been stage-managed.
"They've done that. And it was done under the auspices of the United Nations. We need to respect that process. We need to work within that legitimate authority that they've made a decision on and make a point where we can find a way for that legitimate authority to make a decision whether or not the choice of autonomy or the choice of an independent autonomy will be the path that both parties will agree to put an agenda on to work towards into the future."
Gordon Darcy Lilo
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2) Is a UN resolution on Papua impossible?
Budi Hernawan, Jayapura | Opinion | Fri, March 21 2014, 9:50 AM
At the 25th session of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva, Switzerland, on March 4, Vauatu Prime Minister Moana Carcasses Kalosil called on the council “to consider adopting a country mandate on the situation of human rights in West Papua”.
What does this motion mean? This motion is not novel. Rather, it is a renewed call by Kalosil, which he had previously presented to the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly last November.
Although it is not unusual for a UN member state to request an investigation into the state of human rights in another state, such a motion is largely unfavorable among member states and generally meets fierce opposition from targeted countries and their allies. Growing concern among the UN groupings has contributed to the politicization of the development of a country mandate, as this has been labeled a “naming and shaming” tactic.
During the era of the Human Rights Committee, the council’s predecessor, the African grouping, for instance, viewed the mandate as a continuation of Western colonialism in disguise.
As a result, the African grouping managed to end the country mandates for their continent. The Asian grouping shared the same point of view, despite its failure to achieve a unified voice to advocate for this position. Currently, there are 14 country mandates, including six mandates for the African grouping, six for the Asian grouping, one for the Eastern European grouping and one for the Latin America-Caribbean grouping. None is assigned for the Western grouping. In contrast to the thematic mandates, which rapidly multiply, the country mandate remains significantly low in number within the HRC.
The more important question, however, is why Vanuatu is so persistent in raising the issue of human rights in Papua and West Papua at the UN forums, despite minimal support from its neighbors in the Pacific and its own Asia-Pacific grouping within the UN itself? In its right of reply, Indonesia played down Vanuatu’s endeavor.
It argued that the issue of Papua simply served as a commodity for Vanuatu’s domestic politics, not for Papuans. This argument also pointedly refers to a recent visit by the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) to Jakarta, Ambon, Malukku, and Jayapura, Papua, as well as the existing bilateral cooperation agreement between Indonesia and Vanuatu.
While the MSG’s visit took place on the invitation of Jakarta, the purpose of the visit significantly changed. Instead of implementing the 2013 MSG communiqué, the visit put a strong emphasis on economic cooperation with Indonesia, not on the human rights situation of Papuans. That is why Vanuatu officially withdrew itself from the delegation.
The visit to Jayapura was meaningless. No meeting was organized for the delegation to meet with survivors of human rights abuses or civil society organizations. The only meeting was held between the MSG delegation and bureaucrats and politicians. As a result, the Papua New Guinea delegation was quoted in online media stating there were no human rights abuses in Papua.
Such a conclusion is understandable, given that the delegation only met bureaucrats and politicians who may not be subject to gross human rights abuses.
A harder question that Vanuatu has to answer is its existing ties with Indonesia. Vanuatu cannot pretend that the agreement on bilateral cooperation in development does not exist.
Surely, Vanuatu can argue that it is acting on the principle of responsibility to protect (R2P) principle, which was recently endorsed by
the UN. Grounded in Article 24 of the UN Charter, the principle redefines the essence of state sovereignty as a responsibility, rather than simply immunity from public scrutiny.
The state holds the primary responsibility for the protection of its people. Where a population is suffering serious harm, such as a genocide, crimes against humanity, an internal war, insurgency or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility, the principle yields to the international responsibility to protect.
As Kalosil emphasizes, Papua has long suffered not only from crimes against humanity committed by Indonesian state actors but also from the negligence of the international community to act. It is arguable, therefore, that the R2P is applicable for Papua.
Nonetheless, we are all aware of the high politics that exist within the UN system, to which Indonesia is no stranger. On the contrary, it is a significant player within the HRC as well as the UN system at large. Indonesia actively engages in the UN Peace-building Commission to promote peace around the globe.
It also continues to contribute troops to MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo, one of the deadliest protracted conflicts in the Great Lakes area of Africa. Having managed to sign a peace deal with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Indonesia has also been sought by ASEAN countries for advice in dealing with armed conflict in the region. Indonesia possesses sufficient credentials as a peace promoter.
Vanuatu, on the other hand, is no novice either. Together with Nauru and Timor Leste, among others, it managed to put French Polynesia back onto the agenda of the UN Decolonization Commission. Of course, a resolution on Papua cannot be secured overnight.
It will be a long and painful journey for Vanuatu if this small and politically unstable country persistently works on it. It has to mobilize support within the UN to secure enough votes to pass a resolution, which will probably not happen in the near future.
In the meantime, Papuans should be well aware of the reality that this is just the beginning.
The writer is an independent scholar based in Jayapura, Papua.
What does this motion mean? This motion is not novel. Rather, it is a renewed call by Kalosil, which he had previously presented to the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly last November.
Although it is not unusual for a UN member state to request an investigation into the state of human rights in another state, such a motion is largely unfavorable among member states and generally meets fierce opposition from targeted countries and their allies. Growing concern among the UN groupings has contributed to the politicization of the development of a country mandate, as this has been labeled a “naming and shaming” tactic.
During the era of the Human Rights Committee, the council’s predecessor, the African grouping, for instance, viewed the mandate as a continuation of Western colonialism in disguise.
As a result, the African grouping managed to end the country mandates for their continent. The Asian grouping shared the same point of view, despite its failure to achieve a unified voice to advocate for this position. Currently, there are 14 country mandates, including six mandates for the African grouping, six for the Asian grouping, one for the Eastern European grouping and one for the Latin America-Caribbean grouping. None is assigned for the Western grouping. In contrast to the thematic mandates, which rapidly multiply, the country mandate remains significantly low in number within the HRC.
The more important question, however, is why Vanuatu is so persistent in raising the issue of human rights in Papua and West Papua at the UN forums, despite minimal support from its neighbors in the Pacific and its own Asia-Pacific grouping within the UN itself? In its right of reply, Indonesia played down Vanuatu’s endeavor.
It argued that the issue of Papua simply served as a commodity for Vanuatu’s domestic politics, not for Papuans. This argument also pointedly refers to a recent visit by the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) to Jakarta, Ambon, Malukku, and Jayapura, Papua, as well as the existing bilateral cooperation agreement between Indonesia and Vanuatu.
While the MSG’s visit took place on the invitation of Jakarta, the purpose of the visit significantly changed. Instead of implementing the 2013 MSG communiqué, the visit put a strong emphasis on economic cooperation with Indonesia, not on the human rights situation of Papuans. That is why Vanuatu officially withdrew itself from the delegation.
The visit to Jayapura was meaningless. No meeting was organized for the delegation to meet with survivors of human rights abuses or civil society organizations. The only meeting was held between the MSG delegation and bureaucrats and politicians. As a result, the Papua New Guinea delegation was quoted in online media stating there were no human rights abuses in Papua.
Such a conclusion is understandable, given that the delegation only met bureaucrats and politicians who may not be subject to gross human rights abuses.
A harder question that Vanuatu has to answer is its existing ties with Indonesia. Vanuatu cannot pretend that the agreement on bilateral cooperation in development does not exist.
Surely, Vanuatu can argue that it is acting on the principle of responsibility to protect (R2P) principle, which was recently endorsed by
the UN. Grounded in Article 24 of the UN Charter, the principle redefines the essence of state sovereignty as a responsibility, rather than simply immunity from public scrutiny.
The state holds the primary responsibility for the protection of its people. Where a population is suffering serious harm, such as a genocide, crimes against humanity, an internal war, insurgency or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility, the principle yields to the international responsibility to protect.
As Kalosil emphasizes, Papua has long suffered not only from crimes against humanity committed by Indonesian state actors but also from the negligence of the international community to act. It is arguable, therefore, that the R2P is applicable for Papua.
Nonetheless, we are all aware of the high politics that exist within the UN system, to which Indonesia is no stranger. On the contrary, it is a significant player within the HRC as well as the UN system at large. Indonesia actively engages in the UN Peace-building Commission to promote peace around the globe.
It also continues to contribute troops to MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo, one of the deadliest protracted conflicts in the Great Lakes area of Africa. Having managed to sign a peace deal with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Indonesia has also been sought by ASEAN countries for advice in dealing with armed conflict in the region. Indonesia possesses sufficient credentials as a peace promoter.
Vanuatu, on the other hand, is no novice either. Together with Nauru and Timor Leste, among others, it managed to put French Polynesia back onto the agenda of the UN Decolonization Commission. Of course, a resolution on Papua cannot be secured overnight.
It will be a long and painful journey for Vanuatu if this small and politically unstable country persistently works on it. It has to mobilize support within the UN to secure enough votes to pass a resolution, which will probably not happen in the near future.
In the meantime, Papuans should be well aware of the reality that this is just the beginning.
The writer is an independent scholar based in Jayapura, Papua.
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3) In Soviet Russia: A farcical moral condemnation of Russia
Pierre Marthinus, Jakarta | Opinion | Fri, March 21 2014, 9:48 AM
Does the argument that “a choice isn’t a choice when made with a gun to your head” really stand? Unfortunately not.
The Indonesian revolutionary rallying call was “merdeka atau mati” — the equivalent of Patrick Henry’s “give me liberty or give me death”.
In the early years of the Indonesian revolution, British forces were sent in to quell the nascent Indonesian nation and ordinary Indonesians were forced to make that difficult — if not impossible — decision at gunpoint.
The national vote commenced under a heavy British military presence in Surabaya and Bandung, the voting paper was Indonesian soil, the voting ink was Indonesian blood, and the cost of registering was the lives of able-bodied men, women and children — it was Indonesia’s rendition of universal suffrage at its best.
Dutch observers, unconvinced the vote was free and fair, decided to organize their own series of “referendums” in other major Indonesian cities, resulting in a very high turnout and an astounding number of Indonesians voting for independence. Yes, such votes were choices made at gunpoint.
The foul-smelling truth is that Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine’s Crimea is as legitimate as Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975, Australia’s intervention in East Timor in 1999, and the US intervention in Iraq in 2003.
Crimea’s referendum — held under the shadow of Russia’s military presence — is as legitimate as the 1969 Act of Free Choice in Papua held under Indonesian military presence and the Iraq elections held under a heavy US military presence. The only difference is the selection of territorial scale, legal pretexts and moral justifications for each intervention.
Undisclosed 30-year-old Australian documents are still being withheld at the moment (The Guardian Australia, Jan. 30, 2014), but their contents are already speculated upon; that Western powers, especially US and Australia, not only permitted, but were likely the main reasons behind Soeharto’s decision to invade East Timor to prevent a communist takeover of East Timor by the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) in 1975.
Australia secured a favorable maritime border with Indonesia and could sleep better at night, knowing there was no East Timorese “Cuba” north of its border.
Historically, dealing with Western powers is a lot like sharing your bathtub with a bull shark and a saltwater crocodile while trying to negotiate a recurring Faustian bargain — mostly printed in fine print — on how you can get your rubber ducky back from them.
Look no further than Australia’s Aborigines and the native Americans in the US, the first major trading partners of Western powers. Their history will reveal trade “agreements” made at gunpoint, “free and fair” referendums of white male settlers, just wars to conquer “empty and uninhabited land”, as well as “private ownership” over other human beings. Trading whole continents for reservation zones, welfare coupons and university tuition waivers is not really my idea of a “free and fair” trade.
Internationally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) cannot declare the Crimean referendum illegal simply because their boat, carrying a number of unsolicited observers, was turned away and barred from entering Crimea by Moscow.
The point is that “the web of international agreements and institutions” that had once failed so miserably in preventing the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 will inevitably perform an encore, this time for a Crimean audience.
Interventionist Western powers, however, are far from being the political embodiment of evil. If anything, dancing in uncharted waters with such beautiful beasts is an extremely rewarding political and intellectual venture for any nation. Their long blood-tainted history inspires fear, excitement, contempt and inspiration — all at the same time.
Just like the excessive number of teeth that a bull shark or a crocodile has, the West wield weapons in excessive numbers, amassing quantities of arms that no “sane nations” should ever have, let alone use against others. Their fearsome form, preying eyes and killing instincts, designed to elegantly maim and dismember other sovereign nations, have mainly evolved from their “most basic instinct of surviving in places they shouldn’t be in”.
These awe-inspiring beasts have earned their place at the very top of the global political food chain and therefore deserve our utmost respect and admiration. A rising Indonesia hould always keep this in mind and at heart.
I am merely trying to show that historical, legal and moral condemnations are of little value and at times can be deeply flawed. My point is that diplomatic arguments should be made on the basis of Crimean and/or Ukrainian interests rather than from a Western-biased historical, legal and moral condemnation of Russia alone.
Most Western diplomatic criticism of Russia often seems like an uncreative plagiarized fill-in-the-dots template devised by an overpaid Washington-based public diplomacy firm struggling to keep its government contracts and refusing to downsize its employees.
Ironically, Moscow has been doing a relatively better job, choosing all the right diplomatic keywords, invoking the rhetoric of a “responsibility to protect” the Russian-speaking population of Crimea and the Crimean “right to self-determination”.
Recently, the US organized a discussion on the Crimean crisis in Jakarta, but decided only to invite representatives of Poland and Ukraine — the equivalent of a low blow in public diplomacy. The Russian ambassador, unfortunately, decided to crash the party “Putin-style” and conveyed his utmost displeasure at the organizers for all the participants to see.
Russia is unflinching, allowing itself to neither bleed nor show fear to the West. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brinkmanship was reckless enough to be taken seriously, but not so much that it would inevitably hurt Moscow’s own strategic interest.
The West’s response is now “more talk than walk” due to three main factors, namely their economic downturn, Russia’s own leverage, and the asymmetry of interests regarding Ukraine. In the current US economic downturn, any form of military conflict with Russia is unlikely since the costs of deploying troops in combat theaters increases exponentially with distance, far outweighing any perceived benefits.
The US, still paying for Afghanistan and Iraq, will most likely resort to military maneuvering and posturing to save face, but is unlikely to take any real action. Australia, the only Western power unaffected by the economic downturn, will continue to be a militarily insignificant cheerleader — instead of a quarterback — for the West.
Unfortunately, Ukraine has been taking and measuring risks like a broken calculator and splashing around wildly like a cat thrown into a bathtub — yes, the bathtub with the bull shark and the saltwater crocodile.
Kiev could not foresee Western propensity toward inaction and failed to accommodate Russia’s strategic interests, overestimated its own value to the West and underestimated Moscow’s intention to defend its strategic interests by any means necessary.
Aggressive military action against the nuclear-powered bear-riding Kalashnikov-wielding Putin is not a very enlightened argument by any standards. Moscow makes it clear that it is only playing “the game” of interventions that Western powers have so long played. Unfortunately, in Soviet Russia, the game plays the West.
Again, diplomatic arguments made on the basis of Crimean and/or Ukrainian interests are more appealing to the Indonesian public than a deeply flawed Western-biased historical, legal and moral condemnation of Russia alone.
The writer is executive director for the Marthinus Academy in Jakarta.
The Indonesian revolutionary rallying call was “merdeka atau mati” — the equivalent of Patrick Henry’s “give me liberty or give me death”.
In the early years of the Indonesian revolution, British forces were sent in to quell the nascent Indonesian nation and ordinary Indonesians were forced to make that difficult — if not impossible — decision at gunpoint.
The national vote commenced under a heavy British military presence in Surabaya and Bandung, the voting paper was Indonesian soil, the voting ink was Indonesian blood, and the cost of registering was the lives of able-bodied men, women and children — it was Indonesia’s rendition of universal suffrage at its best.
Dutch observers, unconvinced the vote was free and fair, decided to organize their own series of “referendums” in other major Indonesian cities, resulting in a very high turnout and an astounding number of Indonesians voting for independence. Yes, such votes were choices made at gunpoint.
The foul-smelling truth is that Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine’s Crimea is as legitimate as Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975, Australia’s intervention in East Timor in 1999, and the US intervention in Iraq in 2003.
Crimea’s referendum — held under the shadow of Russia’s military presence — is as legitimate as the 1969 Act of Free Choice in Papua held under Indonesian military presence and the Iraq elections held under a heavy US military presence. The only difference is the selection of territorial scale, legal pretexts and moral justifications for each intervention.
Undisclosed 30-year-old Australian documents are still being withheld at the moment (The Guardian Australia, Jan. 30, 2014), but their contents are already speculated upon; that Western powers, especially US and Australia, not only permitted, but were likely the main reasons behind Soeharto’s decision to invade East Timor to prevent a communist takeover of East Timor by the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) in 1975.
Australia secured a favorable maritime border with Indonesia and could sleep better at night, knowing there was no East Timorese “Cuba” north of its border.
Historically, dealing with Western powers is a lot like sharing your bathtub with a bull shark and a saltwater crocodile while trying to negotiate a recurring Faustian bargain — mostly printed in fine print — on how you can get your rubber ducky back from them.
Look no further than Australia’s Aborigines and the native Americans in the US, the first major trading partners of Western powers. Their history will reveal trade “agreements” made at gunpoint, “free and fair” referendums of white male settlers, just wars to conquer “empty and uninhabited land”, as well as “private ownership” over other human beings. Trading whole continents for reservation zones, welfare coupons and university tuition waivers is not really my idea of a “free and fair” trade.
Internationally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) cannot declare the Crimean referendum illegal simply because their boat, carrying a number of unsolicited observers, was turned away and barred from entering Crimea by Moscow.
The point is that “the web of international agreements and institutions” that had once failed so miserably in preventing the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 will inevitably perform an encore, this time for a Crimean audience.
Interventionist Western powers, however, are far from being the political embodiment of evil. If anything, dancing in uncharted waters with such beautiful beasts is an extremely rewarding political and intellectual venture for any nation. Their long blood-tainted history inspires fear, excitement, contempt and inspiration — all at the same time.
Just like the excessive number of teeth that a bull shark or a crocodile has, the West wield weapons in excessive numbers, amassing quantities of arms that no “sane nations” should ever have, let alone use against others. Their fearsome form, preying eyes and killing instincts, designed to elegantly maim and dismember other sovereign nations, have mainly evolved from their “most basic instinct of surviving in places they shouldn’t be in”.
These awe-inspiring beasts have earned their place at the very top of the global political food chain and therefore deserve our utmost respect and admiration. A rising Indonesia hould always keep this in mind and at heart.
I am merely trying to show that historical, legal and moral condemnations are of little value and at times can be deeply flawed. My point is that diplomatic arguments should be made on the basis of Crimean and/or Ukrainian interests rather than from a Western-biased historical, legal and moral condemnation of Russia alone.
Most Western diplomatic criticism of Russia often seems like an uncreative plagiarized fill-in-the-dots template devised by an overpaid Washington-based public diplomacy firm struggling to keep its government contracts and refusing to downsize its employees.
Ironically, Moscow has been doing a relatively better job, choosing all the right diplomatic keywords, invoking the rhetoric of a “responsibility to protect” the Russian-speaking population of Crimea and the Crimean “right to self-determination”.
Recently, the US organized a discussion on the Crimean crisis in Jakarta, but decided only to invite representatives of Poland and Ukraine — the equivalent of a low blow in public diplomacy. The Russian ambassador, unfortunately, decided to crash the party “Putin-style” and conveyed his utmost displeasure at the organizers for all the participants to see.
Russia is unflinching, allowing itself to neither bleed nor show fear to the West. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brinkmanship was reckless enough to be taken seriously, but not so much that it would inevitably hurt Moscow’s own strategic interest.
The West’s response is now “more talk than walk” due to three main factors, namely their economic downturn, Russia’s own leverage, and the asymmetry of interests regarding Ukraine. In the current US economic downturn, any form of military conflict with Russia is unlikely since the costs of deploying troops in combat theaters increases exponentially with distance, far outweighing any perceived benefits.
The US, still paying for Afghanistan and Iraq, will most likely resort to military maneuvering and posturing to save face, but is unlikely to take any real action. Australia, the only Western power unaffected by the economic downturn, will continue to be a militarily insignificant cheerleader — instead of a quarterback — for the West.
Unfortunately, Ukraine has been taking and measuring risks like a broken calculator and splashing around wildly like a cat thrown into a bathtub — yes, the bathtub with the bull shark and the saltwater crocodile.
Kiev could not foresee Western propensity toward inaction and failed to accommodate Russia’s strategic interests, overestimated its own value to the West and underestimated Moscow’s intention to defend its strategic interests by any means necessary.
Aggressive military action against the nuclear-powered bear-riding Kalashnikov-wielding Putin is not a very enlightened argument by any standards. Moscow makes it clear that it is only playing “the game” of interventions that Western powers have so long played. Unfortunately, in Soviet Russia, the game plays the West.
Again, diplomatic arguments made on the basis of Crimean and/or Ukrainian interests are more appealing to the Indonesian public than a deeply flawed Western-biased historical, legal and moral condemnation of Russia alone.
The writer is executive director for the Marthinus Academy in Jakarta.
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